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In this issue...
Pension fund managers have devised ways to effectively skirt the rule
that limits them to acquiring no more than 30 percent of the shares
eligible to vote for the directors of a corporation. It’s time for
regulators to enforce the rule or eliminate it entirely, thereby giving
pension funds a voice commensurate with their equity stake.
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THE PENSION PAPERSThe security of pension plan assets is of crucial importance to Canadians in the private
and public sectors. Regulations designed to ensure the stability of these plans through
diversification currently take two forms: general “prudent person” standards that
managers must comply with, and a series of more specific quantitative rules that
restrict the activities of pension managers. This Commentary addresses a particular
rule, the 30 percent rule, which is an impediment to the investment decisions of
Canadian pension plan managers. The paper argues that the rule should be eliminated
in favour of greater reliance on a principles-based approach.
The 30 percent rule restricts pension plans from holding more than 30 percent of the
votes to elect the board of directors of a Canadian corporation. The original
motivation was to encourage passive investment by financial institutions and prevent
the concentration of ownership of commercial business by Canadian financial
institutions. In practice, the rules do not restrict managers from taking large stakes in
corporations, but do require them to construct elaborate transactions in order to
satisfy regulators. 
Pensions plans face three principle challenges due to the 30 percent rule: i) the rule is
only subject to superficial compliance, as regulators have allowed companies to work
around the rule, resulting in unnecessary complexity and increased transaction costs;
ii) since no other OECD jurisdiction has a similar rule, Canadian plans are at a
disadvantage relative to foreign competitors when competing for a given investment;
and  iii) there are governance problems that result from disaggregating ownership from
control.
A better method than quantitative restrictions is to rely on prudent person standards.
This method allows managers to use their expertise and discretion in constructing
their portfolios. The author explains the case for adopting prudent person standards
combined with appropriate guidance and direction to pension fund managers in place
of quantitative restrictions. An evaluation of potential reforms leads to the conclusion
that the 30 percent rule should be eliminated.
ABOUTTHE INSTITUTE
The C.D. Howe Institute is a leading independent, economic and social policy research institution.
The Institute promotes sound policies in these fields for all Canadians through its research and
communications. Its nationwide activities include regular policy roundtables and presentations by
policy staff in major regional centres, as well as before parliamentary committees. The Institute’s
individual and corporate members are drawn from business, universities and the professions across
the country.
INDEPENDENT • REASONED ￿ RELEVANT
THE AUTHOR OF
THIS ISSUE
POONAM PURI is Associate
Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall
Law School, and Associate
Director, Hennick Centre for
Business and Law, York
University.  
Rigorous external review of every
major policy study, undertaken by
academics and outside experts,
helps ensure the quality, integrity
and objectivity of the Institute’s
research.
$12.00; ISBN 0-88806-747-X 
ISSN 0824-8001 (print); 
ISSN 1703-0765 (online)
THE STUDY IN BRIEFCommentary 283 | 1
P
ension funds play a critical role
in the Canadian economy, both
as guardians of the retirement
dreams of a large segment of the
workforce, and as major investors in
enterprise. The legal and regulatory
framework that pension funds must
operate within has a direct affect on
their viability,  and so merits careful
consideration.
In particular, one investment rule that pension
funds must comply with should be reconsidered –
the 30 percent rule, which limits pension funds 
to voting no more than 30 percent of the shares
entitled to elect the board of directors of a
corporation. This paper argues that this rule should
be eliminated in favor of a regulatory framework
that advances a more principles-based approach. 
The regulatory framework for investments made
by pension funds in Canada uses both principles
and rules. On one hand, the “prudent person”
standard, a general principle, requires the pension
plan administrator to invest the pension funds
using the care, diligence and skill of a person of
ordinary prudence. On the other hand, the
framework imposes detailed quantitative rules 
and limits on asset classes, specific investments 
and control. 
The 30 percent rule is a specific quantitative
restriction that provides that the administrator of a
pension plan shall not, directly or indirectly, invest
the monies of the plan in the securities of a
corporation to which are attached more than 30
percent of the votes that may be cast to elect the
directors of the corporation. (Defined resource
corporations, real estate corporations and
investment corporations are exempted from the
rule, although other rules apply as outlined in Table
1.) This rule was intended to encourage passive
investment by financial institutions and prevent the
concentration of ownership of commercial
businesses by Canadian financial institutions. 
This Commentary will begin by briefly
summarizing the types of quantitative rules in
Canada, and the arguments for the elimination 
of the 30 percent rule. It will then discuss the
general debate on rules-based versus principles-
based regulation and some of the challenges in
implementing a principles-based regulatory
framework. Next, it will discuss the rationales 
for the 30 percent rule in detail and evaluate 
three negative effects on the Canadian economy
and pension plans that throw the existing rule
into question. Turning to potential reforms, the
paper will discuss 10 factors to consider in
assessing them. Finally, the options for reform 
of the rule will be presented and evaluated.
Although there are reforms that fall short of
eliminating the rule entirely, a careful assessment
leads to the conclusion that elimination is the 
best potential option.
Background
In Canada, pension plans are regulated federally or
provincially, depending on whether the employer is
regulated by the federal or provincial/territorial
government. Pension plans of employers that fall
under federal jurisdiction, such as banks, airlines, and
railways, are regulated by the federal Pension Benefits
Standards Act, 1985, whereas pension plans of
employers that fall under provincial/ territorial
jurisdiction, such as public schools, are regulated by
provincial pension standards legislation. Schedule III
of the regulations of the federal Pension Benefits
Standards Act, 1985, set out a series of quantitative
restrictions on investments that can be made by
pension funds. Many provinces, including Alberta,
British Columbia, Manitoba, Nova Scotia and
Ontario have adopted federal Schedule III, even
though they each have their own pension benefits
legislation. Therefore, the quantitative restrictions in
Schedule III apply to the vast majority of private
pension funds in Canada. Table 1 below sets out
some of the key quantitative rules under Schedule III.
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Short Summary of Reasons for Abolishing the
30 percent Rule
The 30 percent rule has not been consistently
enforced by pension fund regulators. Technical,
superficial compliance by pension funds has been
considered acceptable, most recently in the
proposed acquisition of Bell Canada Enterprises
(BCE) where the Ontario Teachers’ Pension Fund
(Teachers’) was able to gain enough votes to
control the company by having a portion of its
acquired shares nominally held by another
individual (as explained below), clearly
undermining the rationales upon which the rule is
based. 
The rule therefore needlessly increases
transaction costs and complexity by interfering
with optimal investment management techniques.
The rule requires pension funds to construct
elaborate financial, legal and organizational
structures, which allow them to own more than 30
percent of the equity of a company without
controlling more than 30 percent of the votes
required to elect the board of directors, so as to be
in compliance with the rule. 
The rule also puts Canadian pension funds at a
competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis foreign pension
funds. Canada is the only OECD country that
imposes such a rule on pension fund investments,
which is a concern when Canadian pension funds
are competing with foreign funds on a global basis
for investments. 
While the transaction costs analysis and the
competitive disadvantage arguments are
compelling, another persuasive public rationale 
for abolishing the rule is that it creates a serious
corporate governance problem by separating 
equity ownership from control. The ability of a
shareholder – in this context, a pension fund – to
vote to elect (or remove) the directors is a critical
corporate governance mechanism that acts to
ensure that directors and the professional managers
whom they oversee fulfill their duties and
responsibilities in good faith and with a view to
the best interests of the corporation, and in
particular, to shareholders. The 30 percent rule
currently prevents this convergence of interests
between directors, managers and shareholders, in
the context of all equity investments in public and
private companies, but particularly in the context
of private equity investments by Canadian pension
funds.
Eliminating the 30 percent rule would enhance
the oversight, accountability and transparency of
public and private companies and allow for more
effective risk management by Canadian pension
C.D. Howe Institute
Portfolio Diversification - The 10 percent Rule for a Single Entity
￿ Restricts pension plans to holding no more than 10 percent of the book value of the pension fund in any one entity. 
￿ Debt of the federal government, provincial/territorial governments and agencies thereof is exempt from the 10 percent rule.
Industry Concentration - The 5 percent, 15 percent and 25 percent Rules for Real Estate
￿ Restricts pension plans to holding 5 percent of the book value of the fund's total assets in any single parcel of real estate or
Canadian resource property; 
￿ Restricts pension plans to holding 15 percent of the book value of the fund's total assets in all Canadian resource
properties; and 
￿ Restricts pension plans to holding 25 percent of the book value of the fund's total assets in the aggregate of real estate and
Canadian resource properties.
Passive Investment - The 30 percent Rule on Control
￿ Restricts pension plans to holding no more than 30 percent of the shares eligible to elect the Board of a corporation.
￿ Defined resource corporations, real estate corporations and investment corporations are exempt from the 30 percent rule
subject to undertakings and specific requirements.
Table 1:  Quantitative Rules for Private Pension Funds in CanadaCommentary 283 | 3
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1 A reasonable argument can be made that all quantitative rules restricting investments by pension funds should be abolished; this paper
focuses only on the 30 percent rule, which is regarded as one of the most onerous restrictions that larger public sector pension funds must
comply with.
2 Only 32 of the top 100 pension funds in Canada have an allocation for private equity. Teachers’ owns more than 10 percent of all of the
private equity and mezzanine debt in Canada. The returns on private equity are significantly higher than the overall portfolio returns.
See Puri (2007, p. 5).
3 Vittas (1999, p. 22); Davis (1995, p. 368); Davis (1997, pp.93-96); Queisser (1998, p.45). 
4 Ford (2008).
funds, ultimately benefiting plan members,
employers and retirees in Canada.1
The Debate on Rules versus Principles
Both investment rules and principles of prudence
attempt to achieve portfolio diversification, and
thus asset and pension benefit security, albeit
through different means. While rules, such as the
30 percent rule, provide specific quantitative
restrictions on investments, a principles-based
approach focuses more on high-level, general
standards and recognizes the expertise and
experience of pension fund administrators. 
A rules-based approach that provides specific
quantitative restrictions on investments has certain
benefits for both regulators and regulated pension
funds since rules create bright lines regarding what
is and what is not permitted. Compared to
principles, rules allow for greater certainty and
predictability for pension fund managers as to
their compliance with the law. They also allow for
regulators to monitor compliance with the law
with greater ease relative to principles.
However, a rules-based approach is based on a
“one size fits all mentality” for the entire spectrum
of pension funds in Canada, which vary in size,
types of investments, resources, expertise and
governance. Well-governed pension funds in
Canada have the resources and expertise to
implement more sophisticated risk management
systems and processes to evaluate and oversee
investments. Some pension funds may also have a
greater appetite for private equity investments,
which makes the 30 percent rule particularly
grating in this context because it takes away an
important mechanism – electing directors to the
board – that would allow them to exert influence
or exercise control over their investments in private
companies.2
A rules-based approach to investment regulation
can also encourage a loophole mentality on the
part of pension fund managers. They may become
more interested in checking off the boxes than they
are with ensuring full and complete compliance
with the rationales underlying the rules. A pension
fund can achieve technical compliance with a rule
but avoid it in substance. 
A rules-based approach to investment regulation
also constrains the good judgment, expertise, and
decision-making authority of a pension fund
manager to determine whether an investment is
prudent in light of the portfolio of investments
held by the fund. 
Some commentators have also argued that the
quantitative restrictions imposed on pension fund
investments are a way for governments to have a
steady demand for their own debt securities, as
well as being captive sources of financing for
government budgets or social investments.3
In contrast to the rules-based approach, the
principles-based approach focuses more on high-
level, general standards. This approach recognizes
that regulators and pension funds are “partners in a
shared mission” to ensure portfolio diversification
and security of pension benefits. Under a
principles-based regime, a regulator is “more
pragmatic, more willing to devolve responsibility
to industry, and perhaps humbler about how well-
informed and well-equipped it is relative to
industry itself.”4 Under the prudent person
standard for pension fund investments,
responsibility falls squarely on the pension fund’s
senior management for implementation of| 4 Commentary 283
decision-making processes and risk control systems
to ensure that the principle is being met. The
prudent person standard recognizes that not all
funds are alike and it therefore provides flexibility
to the fund manager to determine which
investments and what asset mix are most appro-
priate for the portfolio. Under this approach, the
pension fund manager would develop a coherent
and explicit statement of objectives and principles
as well as procedures to be followed in making
investment decisions.
Challenges to Principles-Based Regulation
Despite these significant benefits, a principles-
based approach can lead to challenges. While
principles provide flexibility, they may also
encourage “herding behavior” by pension fund
managers, whereby they are effectively paralyzed by
their choices and end up following the lead of
others in the industry.5 Such behavior can
diminish systematic diversification benefits and
lead to excessive pro-cyclicality in the market.
A principles-based approach to regulating fund
investments can create a lack of certainty and
predictability for pension funds about regulators’
expectations. The same principle may also be
interpreted differently by pension funds of
different sizes, capacity and expertise. Given that a
principle may be interpreted differently by
regulators and the different members of the
pension fund community, there needs to be
mechanisms put in place for ensuring a shared
understanding of principles. However, a pure
principles-based system can be refined without
incorporating specific quantitative limits; for
example, the Quebec Supplemental Pension Plans
Act makes diversification a specific requirement
and provides additional guidance with respect to
investment policy, without quantitative constraints
on how to achieve that diversification.6
A principles-based approach also creates
challenges for both regulators and pension funds in
respect of compliance and enforcement. How is
compliance with the prudent person standard
assessed both internally within a pension fund and
then ultimately by regulators? Is it based on having
appropriate decision-making processes and systems
in place to ensure that investments and portfolios
meet the test of prudence?  Or, is it based on
substantive outcomes and performance results of
particular investments, asset classes and/or the
entire portfolio? In hindsight, an investment may
not be prudent because it did not ultimately
perform well, but clearly prudence needs to be
assessed based on the information that was
available and the diligence that was conducted at
the time that the investment was made.
Compliance and enforcement are nuanced and
more subtle processes under a prudent person
standard, as they are based on the evaluation of
behavourial processes, not necessarily actual
outcomes. 
A useful line of enquiry in the debate on rules
versus principles in pension fund investment
regulation is to examine the performance by
pension funds under both regimes. Studies show
that pension funds governed under jurisdictions
that have prudent person standards achieve better
performance results than those governed under a
rules-based approach. One study examined returns
in OECD countries from 1967 to 1990 and found
that the average returns for countries with prudent
person standards were 3.4 percent compared with
2.9 percent in countries with asset restrictions.7
Another study found that between 1984 and 1993,
the average real rates of return were 9.5 percent for
“prudent person” countries versus 6.9 percent for
countries with asset restrictions.8 One should
exercise caution in relying too heavily on these
findings, as there may very well be other factors
which complement, interact with or override the
effect of portfolio restrictions for pension funds.9
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Given the level of uncertainty caused by the
recent credit crisis, there may be a general push
towards more prescriptive, rules-based regulation
of pension funds and other financial institutions.
However, principles-based regulation remains a
superior alternative for the very reason that it
allows individual pension funds the flexibility to
respond to the credit crisis in ways that are most
aligned with their particular needs and concerns. A
blanket rules-based approach may have the effect
of stifling the ability of pension fund
administrators to devise investment strategies that
best respond to, and reflect their position within
current market conditions. 
While a detailed examination of all of the
quantitative restrictions imposed on pension funds
is beyond the scope of this paper, it should be
noted that, as a general matter, quantitative
restrictions may be safely supplanted by a prudent
person standard that is combined with appropriate
guidance and direction to pension funds without
specifying quantitative limits.
Rationales for the 30 percent Rule  
Turning back now specifically to the 30 percent
rule, it is useful to consider the public policy
goals it is trying to advance. The rule has two
main rationales. The first is that pension funds
and other financial institutions should be passive
investors. A 1985 Department of Finance
background document on the regulation of
Canadian financial institutions states that the
investments of pension plans and other financial
institutions should be of a passive rather than an
active nature.10 The view at the time was that
“patient” investments do not represent an ideal
match for most of the liabilities carried by such
financial institutions. This view has changed over
time such that real estate and infrastructure
projects, for example, are now viewed as
appropriate matches for the long-term liabilities
that pension funds must meet. The second
rationale for the rule was a desire to maintain a
general separation between the financial and
commercial spheres of economic activity.11
Pension funds, which are responsible for
pensioners’ benefits, are not viewed as commercial
businesses and the view was that they should not
control commercial enterprises in the Canadian
economy. There was concern that public sector
pension plans, in particular, should not control
large chunks of the Canadian economy. 
A concern related to both these rationales was
that a rise of pension fund-managed business will
stifle entreprenurialism in favor of stable cash-flow
maximization. While pension funds have short-
term liabilities that need to be matched with liquid
and stable cash-flows, they also have long-term
liabilities that need to be matched with longer-
term investment which may involve significant
growth and active oversight.12
There is a complex socio-political and economic
context surrounding the division between financial
and commercial spheres in Canada, the US and
the UK – in contrast to other industrialized
economies such as Germany and Japan, where
there is a much closer affiliation between the two
sectors. The separation of the financial and
commercial spheres, in the context of banks in the
Anglo-American model, was originally intended as
a check on banks to prevent them from exercising
undue influence over the commercial sectors of the
economy.13 There was a fear that allowing the
merger of finance and commerce would generate
significant negative economic externalities for third
parties. While some large corporations that
combine financial and commercial activities may
10 When federal Schedule III was enacted in 1993, the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI) published a Regulatory Impact
Analysis Statement that referred to a 1985 document entitled “The Regulation of Canadian Financial Institutions: Proposals for Discussion” and a
related technical supplement as well as a 1986 document entitled “New Directions for the Financial Sector.” The technical supplement contains
some analysis of the rationales of the 30 percent rule. See Department of Finance (1985, Technical Supplement p. 51 and 1986).
11 Ibid.
12 The increasing attention given to socially responsible investment practices on the part of pension funds also indicates that, from a broad policy
perspective, we are now encouraging pension funds to be active rather than passive. See Sturm and Badde (2000). 
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improve operational efficiency, the concern was
that significant costs would be passed along to the
economy as a whole in terms of (i) the
misallocation of credit by banks inappropriately
favouring credit to their affiliates over other
unrelated commercial businesses, (ii) anti-
competitive effects, (iii) exposure of the federal
deposit insurance funds and taxpayers to greater
risks, and (iv) additional supervisory burdens
borne by federal banking or anti-trust regulators
who would have to oversee the investments made
by the bank.14 Whether these concerns are
justified or not depends on how competitive the
markets are in the first place. For example, a bank
could charge above-market rates to creditworthy
competitors of its commercial affiliate, but only if
there were no other lenders to step in and offer the
market rate. Likewise, a bank could charge below-
market rates to its own affiliate (or its affiliate’s
suppliers or customers), but would only do so if
the affiliate could recoup this loss by producing
above-market returns in its own market. Moreover,
there is growing recognition that maintaining a
separation between finance and commerce is
anachronistic to the post-war/depression era in
North America and that in other industrialized
countries such as Germany and Japan, the
financial sector has elaborate affiliations with the
commercial sector.15
There are several reasons why the rationale for
separating commercial and financial activity holds
less force than in the past. First, combining
commercial and financial activities could reduce
information costs between sectors. For example,
one of the basic functions of a bank is to take
deposits and provide finance to firms and other
people in the economy. It is natural for banks to
perform this service because they can gather
information about borrowers more efficiently than
can individual depositors. Thus, it is plausible that
banks would want to hold significant blocks of
equity in firms in order to enhance their position
as intermediaries. By holding a large block of
equity, a bank could provide a source of discipline
to management that would reassure less-informed
investors. 
Another information-related reason for financial
institutions to hold equity in commercial entities is
to reduce their exposure to moral hazards. If it is
difficult for a lender to monitor a borrower’s risks,
limited liability borrowers will have incentives to
increase the risk of their operations. Financial
institutions that anticipate this risk-shifting will
either charge a higher price for the loan or demand
more collateral. One way a firm can overcome this
problem is to offer the financial institution an
equity claim. 
In the context of pension funds, the rationale for
merging commercial and financial activity is
analogous. The same benefits of reduced
information costs and reduced exposure to moral
hazard accrue to pension funds that are able to
hold significant blocks of equity in commercial
enterprises. These benefits are related to the
broader governance concerns that result from
disaggregating ownership of equity and active
oversight, which is perpetuated by the 30 percent
rule. To the extent that pension fund regulators do
not have adequate authority or sufficient
capabilities to monitor pension funds and their
controlling investments appropriately, they should
be provided with the resources to develop the
needed capabilities, rather than preventing these
investments.
While these policy rationales suggest elimination
of the 30 percent rule, the 1985 government
background document actually suggested that the
investment-control threshold limit of 30 percent
be lowered to 10 percent, to make it more
onerous, on the basis that more intricate methods
of exercising control had been devised and a 30
percent limit may no longer be appropriate. It also
suggested that a change to 10 percent would limit
exposure of the pension fund to undue risk. The
government recognized, as stated in the technical
supplement/background document that pension
funds have become major investors in the capital
markets and that these restrictions could be a
14 Brown (1991). 
15 Shull (1999). Commentary 283 | 7
significant impediment to the future functioning
of these markets. However, it concluded that
quantitative limits serve as an important safeguard
by imposing minimum risk-spreading rules on the
fund manager. It is important to note that the rule
does not limit the overall equity position in an
investment, just voting rights, so it is difficult to
justify its existence as a diversification or risk-
spreading tool. 
Challenge 1: Superficial Compliance,
Unnecessary Complexity and Increased
Transaction Costs
Both pension fund regulators and pension funds
seem to be satisfied with technical, superficial
compliance with the 30 percent rule, even though
the underlying rationales of the rule are not
advanced. However, technical compliance with the
rule creates unnecessary complexity and can
increase transaction costs in the process of
investing for pension funds. Regulators generally
accept substantive non-compliance with the rule; it
may be that these regulators recognize that the rule
needs to be repealed but have decided that
permitting technical compliance is less onerous
than organized efforts at regulatory reform. 
The 30 percent rule does not prevent the
pension fund from acquiring a stake greater than
30 percent in the equity of a corporation. It simply
says that the pension fund cannot acquire more
than 30 percent of the shares that elect the
directors of the corporation. When a pension fund
manager decides that it is prudent to acquire a
stake greater than 30 percent in any one
corporation, the pension fund and its advisors have
to construct elaborate financial, legal and
organizational structures to bring their investments
into compliance with the rule. 
There are several methods that have been used.
Convertible debt has been issued in lieu of voting
shares to achieve technical compliance with the 30
percent rule. For example Teachers’ invested $35
million in Railpower Technologies Corp. in 2007
by way of a private placement of unsecured
convertible debentures.16 The debentures are
convertible into common voting shares (with full
voting rights to elect the board) and/or restricted
voting shares with no voting rights in respect of
electing the Board of Directors. If Teachers’ were
to convert all the debentures into common voting
shares, it would hold 56.6 percent of the common
shares, and thus be able to control and elect the
board of directors. However, since Teachers’ cannot
control more than 30 percent of the voting shares,
it would have to convert the debentures into a
combination of voting and non-voting shares to
ensure compliance with the 30 percent rule.
In other transactions, a combination of voting
shares and convertible non-voting shares have been
issued that collectively exceed the 30 percent
ownership, but do not technically exceed the 30
percent control threshold created by the rule. For
example, as at 2007, Teachers’ had an ownership
stake in Maple Leaf Foods Inc. whereby it owned
just over 20 million (19.7 percent) voting common
shares and an additional 22 million non-voting
common shares, together holding 33.6 percent of
the shares of the corporation. The non-voting
shares are convertible into voting shares on a one-
to-one basis at any time at the option of the
holder, and automatically convert to voting shares
upon transfer by Teachers’ to any other person.17
Most starkly, the 30 percent rule was an issue in
the proposed deal to privatize BCE, where one of
the purchasers was also Teachers’. The proposed
transaction was structured so that Teachers’ would
not own more than 30 percent of the shares
eligible to vote to elect the directors. In fact,
Teachers’ would have owned no voting shares in
the corporation at all. A former executive of
Teachers’ would have held 66.7 percent of the
Class A shares of BCE Holdco. He and Teachers’
had an agreement that granted Teachers’ full
voting and transfer rights over the shares. The
former executive could only have voted the 
shares in the manner instructed by Teachers’ and 
he could not in any way have voted them
Independent ￿ Reasoned ￿ Relevant C.D. Howe Institute 
16 See Railpower Technologies Corp., Notice of Meeting (November 15, 2007) and Information Circular for a Special Meeting of Shareholders
to be held on December 18, 2007.
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18 See letter from FSCO at: http://www.crtc.gc.ca/public/broad/applications/2007/FSCO%20letter.PDF. 
19 See CRTC approval at http://www.crtc.gc.ca/archive/ENG/Decisions/2008/db2008-69.htm. 
20 OECD (2007, Appendix 1, Table 3). 
21 Gray (2005). 
independent of Teachers’ instructions. 
The Canadian Radio-television and
Telecommunications Commission (CRTC), which
had to approve the deal, was concerned with the
structure and whether there was compliance with
the 30 percent rule. The Financial Services
Commission of Ontario (FSCO), which is the
provincial regulator responsible for administering
the Ontario Pension Benefits Act, issued a letter that
stated that the proposed structure complied with
the 30 percent restriction to which Teachers’ is
subject.18 FSCO reasoned that Teachers did not
“invest” in the voting shares because the former
executive acquired the Class A voting shares with
his own money (albeit a purely nominal sum).
FSCO also thought it was important that the
former executive did not receive any remuneration
from Teachers’ for the share voting agreement. The
CRTC only accepted and approved this
structure/arrangement after being provided with
this assurance letter from FSCO.19
The structure in the proposed BCE transaction
is perhaps the starkest example of technical
compliance with the 30 percent rule that obtained
express regulatory blessing. Given that this
transaction involved the privatization of Canada’s
largest communications company by Teachers’
and its partners, it is difficult to see how the
rationales of passive investment and maintaining a
separation between financial institutions and the
commercial sphere that underlie the rule would
have been furthered. 
If the government and pension regulators are
serious about the rationales underlying this rule,
then they need to ensure compliance with it by
enforcing it with vigor. If they are no longer
serious about the rule, then why waste resources to
force pension funds to devise structures that make
it appear as if they are complying with it?
Challenge 2: Competitive Disadvantage with
Foreign Pension Plans 
No other OECD jurisdiction has a similar rule
relating to control over a corporation’s board of
directors.20 As such, Canadian pension plans are at
a disadvantage vis-à-vis foreign pension funds
when competing for investments. 
Challenge 3: Governance Problems that Result
from Disaggregating Ownership from Control
Another persuasive public concern about the rule
is that it creates a corporate governance problem
by separating equity ownership from control. The
ability of a shareholder – in this context, a pension
fund – to elect (or remove) the directors is a
critical corporate governance mechanism that acts
to ensure that directors and the professional
managers whom they oversee fulfill their duties
and responsibilities in good faith and with a view
to the best interests of the corporation, including
shareholders. The 30 percent rule currently
prevents this convergence of interests between
directors, managers and shareholders. 
In addition, the Canadian capital markets have a
high proportion of family-controlled public
corporations.21 The rule allows for a greater
possibility of abuse of the minority by the majority
shareholders and a further imbalance of power
between professional managers and controlling
shareholders, on the one hand, and retail and
institutional shareholders on the other.
If a shareholder has, for example, a 60 percent
equity stake in a corporation, why should the law
prevent it voting all of its shares? Where a
shareholder owns more than 30 percent equity
but can only vote 30 percent of the equity, there
are greater possibilities for misconduct by (or at
minimum a misalignment of interests with) 
other larger or controlling shareholders and
professional managers. Commentary 283 | 9
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The ability to elect the board of directors is a
particularly important governance mechanism in
the context of equity investments in private
corporations, where the market is generally less
liquid and hence the possibility of sale – as a
corporate governance mechanism – is less realistic.
Only 32 of the top 100 private pension funds in
Canada have allocations for private equity; from a
systemic perspective, the 30 percent rule may
contribute to the underdeveloped venture and
private equity market in Canada.22
Allowing a pension fund to fully vote the equity
that it owns would enhance the oversight,
accountability and transparency of public and
private companies in the Canadian capital markets. 
Factors to Consider in Reforming the Rule 
The following factors should be considered when
assessing options for reform of the 30 percent rule: 
1. Protecting the assets in the pension plan and
retirees’ benefits.
2. Ensuring a reasonable risk-return tradeoff in
individual investments and the entire portfolio.
3. Ensuring appropriate diversification in a
pension fund portfolio.
4. Ensuring appropriate risk management systems
for making decisions in respect of investments.
5. Impact on pension funds of different sizes,
sophistication, expertise and resources. 
6. The expertise and resources available to the
regulator to oversee and monitor investments
and investment decisions.
7. Policy rationales for passive investment.
8. Policy rationales for separating financial
businesses from commercial businesses.
9. Impact on Canadian capital markets and
ensuring good corporate governance
mechanisms for public and private companies
in the Canadian markets. 
10. Governance in the pension fund including its
ability to take an active role in investments.
None of these factors is determinative, but each
plays a role in assessing the costs, benefits and risks
of various options for reform. 
Factors 1-3 focus on the ultimate goal of
ensuring that retirees’ benefits are secure by
specifying that each investment and the entire
portfolio of investments achieves a reasonable
return in light of its risk, and that the portfolio is
well diversified such that the fund can achieve
reasonably consistent returns under a wide range of
economic conditions. It is important that any
change to the 30 percent rule not undermine these
goals in any way; that said, since the rule does not
limit equity ownership, but only voting control,
abandoning it would not have a negative impact
on diversification.
Factors 4 and 5 are extremely important
considerations in any assessment of options for
reform. The 30 percent rule and other quantitative
restrictions are based on an underlying assumption
that the regulator is in the best position to
determine what an investment portfolio should
look like; this rule also assumes that all pension
funds are alike. The reality is that pension funds
vary in size, sophistication and resources. Some
pension funds have the resources and expertise to
have sophisticated procedures and systems in place
in respect of investment decisions; along the same
line, they also have the internal procedures and
practices in place to ensure that they can effectively
monitor and oversee active and controlling
investments in commercial enterprises. This is not
true for all pension funds, and abolishing the rule
may need to be pursued in conjunction with a
requirement that pension funds ensure they have
the necessary and appropriate systems in place to
make and monitor such investments. 
Factor 6 highlights the importance of the role
of the regulator in overseeing the investment
activities of pension funds. Currently, the 30
percent rule is easily monitored and enforced by
the regulator. Any change to the rule (such as
exemptions or repeal) needs to take into account
the impact on the regulator with respect to its| 10 Commentary 283
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resources and expertise. Under a prudent person
standard without a 30 percent rule, the regulator
may need to provide additional guidance on its
expectations for meeting the standard, without
reference to specific quantitative restrictions on
control. 
Factors 7 and 8 focus on the original rationales
for the rule, and as discussed above, there is a long-
rooted Anglo-American tradition of separating the
financial sphere from the commercial sphere. The
issue is how much weight these considerations
should be given in the modern Canadian economy.
The concerns that arise from allowing financial
institutions to control commercial enterprises have
to be weighed against the benefits of such a
merger, which include reducing information costs
between sectors, reducing moral hazard and
reducing the governance gap, as discussed earlier. 
Factors 9 and 10 focus on the impact of
the rule and its reform to public and private
companies in Canada. As it currently stands, the
legal framework disaggregates ownership from
control by prohibiting pension funds from
exercising their voting rights beyond 30 percent of
the votes entitled to elect the directors. Allowing
for exemptions or, alternatively, eliminating the
rule would allow for this governance gap to be
reduced, thereby strengthening the oversight of
public and private companies in Canada.
These 10 factors need to be considered and
balanced when assessing the various options for
reform to the 30 percent rule. 
Options for Reform to the Rule
There are several options for reform to the 30
percent rule, including the following: 
￿ Maintain the rule, combined with ensuring
compliance and vigorous enforcement;
￿ increase the threshold to a percentage greater
than 30;
￿ grant exemptions on a transaction-by-
transaction basis;  
￿ grant exemptions based on governance
structures of pension fund; or
￿ eliminate the rule.
MAINTAINTHE RULE: If the passive investments and
separation of financial and commercial enterprise
rationales underlying the 30 percent rule remain
important public policy concerns for the
government and stakeholders in today’s economic
reality, then regulators needs to get serious about
enforcing the rule. When regulators do not enforce
legal rules, turn a blind eye to non-compliance, or
expressly endorse avoidance structures, both
regulators and the regulatory framework lose
credibility in the eyes of stakeholders. 
If the rule is to be preserved, then pension fund
regulators should provide clear guidance about
compliance with the rule. They should clearly set
out a list of anti-avoidance provisions – techniques
and maneuvers – that will be considered to be a
violation of the rule. This may include owning, or
exercising control or direction over voting shares,
non-voting shares that are convertible into voting
shares, or debt that is convertible into voting shares.
Under this scenario, Transactions such as the
proposed BCE deal, whereby Teachers’ would have
controlled 67 percent of BCE, would also have been
prohibited, both on the basis of the specific 30
percent rule but also on the larger principle that
pension funds must be passive investors. 
INCREASETHETHRESHOLDTO A PERCENTAGE
GREATERTHAN 30: Increasing the 30 percent
threshold to a higher number, such as 40 percent,
would be an arbitrary move. It would still result in
pension funds maneuvering to avoid the rule and
would also continue to impose corporate
governance challenges because the pension fund as
shareholder would be limited from exercising its
right to elect board members so long as the
number is less than 50 percent.
DISCRETIONARY RELIEF ON ATRANSACTION-BY-
TRANSACTION BASIS: Another reform option
would allow discretionary relief from the 30
percent rule. A pension fund could apply to
regulators to have a particular transaction
exempted from the rule. The challenge is to
determine the basis on which the regulator would
grant an exemption. Would regulators’ review
involve a substantive assessment of the expected
outcome of the investment? Or would regulators’review examine the pension fund’s decision-
making process for the investment? It is difficult to
think of a situation where regulators could do
something other than examine the method in
which the decision or judgment is made, given
that every investment decision is a judgment call
on an unknown future. Before pursuing this
option as a reform possibility, one would need to
ensure that regulators have the infrastructure,
capacity, expertise and resources to engage in such
reviews. This option may also be impractical
because regulators may want to give notice to the
plan membership, which may give rise to members
challenging the investment decision. There may
also be confidentiality concerns about the
proposed investment that is under review.
EXEMPTIONS BASED ON GOVERNANCE
STRUCTURES OFTHE PENSION FUND: Rather than
allowing transaction-by-transaction relief, one
could exempt funds that have appropriate
governance structures in place to ensure effective
decision-making about investments, as well as
appropriate governance structures and processes to
allow for active oversight of investments.23 To
access this exemption, the CEO or the board of
directors of the fund could be required to make a
signed statement that they believe the fund has
adequate risk assessment structures in place to
properly evaluate the various risks involved in
deciding whether to make an equity investment
greater than 30 percent. They should also have to
certify that the fund has the governance systems in
place to actively manage the investment. This
reform could be coupled with refining the
prudence and fiduciary standards expected of
fund managers.24 While this option would not
repeal the rule, it would nonetheless require
regulatory reform.
ELIMINATETHE RULE:The best approach in the
context of the 30 percent rule is to eliminate it
entirely. It is clear that regulators have not enforced
this rule and have given their express and explicit
blessing for transaction structures that clearly
violate its underlying rationales. While passivity
and separation of financial and commercial spheres
were the original rationales for this rule, as stated
over 20 years ago, the reality is that pension funds
are no longer passive investors and are actively
involved as owners of commercial enterprise. 
By eliminating this quantitative limit on
investment, regulators could make investments
subject to a more principles-based “prudent
expert” standard. In relation to having appropriate
mechanisms in a fund’s governance structure to
oversee and ensure compliance with legislative
requirements, having a more principles-based
legislative scheme will allow regulators the
discretion and resources to enforce the principles
effectively. A principles-based approach to the
regulation of pension funds will allow regulators
more discretion to approve a variety of plan
arrangements and issue guidelines specific to new
plan arrangements. Regulators should also have the
power to review and require changes to the fund’s
governance and the power to impose
administrative penalties and other sanctions for
failure to provide important information to the
regulator to allow it to exercise its oversight role. 
A number of principles-based regulatory
instruments can be developed to address the
governance concerns of pension funds.25 For
example, the pension statutes could clarify that
fiduciaries, in making investment decisions, must
make those decisions in the best financial interest
of the plan members and can take nonfinancial
matters such as environmental, social and
governance factors into account only insofar as
they affect the potential risk and return of the
Commentary 283 | 11
Independent ￿ Reasoned ￿ Relevant C.D. Howe Institute 
23 Report of the Expert Commission on Pensions (2008).
24 Ibid; see also, Report of the Joint Expert Panel on Pensions Standards (2008).
25 See Report of the Joint Expert Panel on Pensions Standards (2008) from the Alberta/British Columbia Pensions Standards Review for their
recommendations in this regard.investment. Moreover, training programs at post-
secondary institutions could be made mandatory
for plan fiduciaries to give them more guidance
and context on how to fulfill their roles. Statutory
defenses could also be set up to provide pension
fund fiduciaries with a defense if they can
demonstrate that they have adhered to governance
guidelines and have acted in good faith, on an
informed basis, in the interests of the beneficiaries
and in the absence of conflicts of interest. 
Abolishing the rule would also mean that
pension funds no longer have to engage in legal
maneuvering to be in technical compliance with
the rule at face value. Equally as important, it
would reduce the governance gap by allowing and
encouraging pension funds to be strong and active
shareholders, exercising their ability to elect the
board of directors. This is particularly important in
the context of private equity investments where
other governance mechanisms are not easily
available.
The time has come to repeal the 30 percent rule
and focus more on a prudent person regulatory
standard that better achieves the objectives of
underlying pension fund investment regulation.
Repealing the rule would enhance the oversight,
accountability and transparency of both public and
private companies and allow for more effective risk
management by Canadian pension funds,
ultimately benefiting plan members, employers,
retirees and Canadian taxpayers.
| 12 Commentary 283
C.D. Howe InstituteCommentary 283 | 13
Ambachtsheer, Keith. 2005. “Private Equity and Canadian
Pension Funds: Breaking Down the Barriers, Summary and
Conclusions.” Rotman International Centre for Pension
Management and The Canadian Venture Capital and
Private Equity Association, mimeo.
Ben-Ishai, Stephanie, and Poonam Puri. 2006. “Dual Class
Shares in Canada: An Historical Analysis.” Dalhousie Law
Journal 29, pp.117-158.
Blommestein, Hans J. 1998. “Pension Funds and Capital




Brown, Jonathan.1991. The Separation of Banking and
Commerce. Washington D.C.: Essential Books. Available
from GIS for Equitable and Sustainable Communities, at
http://public-gis.org/reports/sbc.html#VIII. 
Cantillo-Simon, Miguel. (1995). The Rise and Fall of Bank
Control in the United States: 1890-1920. Haas School of
Business, University of California--Berkeley, Finance
Working Paper #254.
Cumming, Douglas, Grant Fleming, and Armin
Schwienbacher. 2005. “Liquidity Risk and Venture Capital
Finance.” Financial Management 34, pp. 77-105.
Davis, E. Philip. 2002. “Prudent person rules or quantitative
restrictions? The regulation of long-term institutional
investors’ portfolios.”  Journal of Pensions Economics and
Finance 1(2), pp.157-191. 
Davis, E. Philip. 1995. Pension Funds: Retirement Income Security
and Capital Markets-An International Perspective. New York:
Oxford University Press.
Davis, E. Philip. 1998. “Regulation of Pension Fund Assets.” In
Hans Blommestein and Norbert Funke, eds. Institutional
Investors in the New Financial Landscape. Paris: OECD. 
Department of Finance Canada. 1985. “The Regulation of
Canadian Financial Institutions: Proposals for Discussion”
and Technical Paper. Ottawa: Department of Finance.
Department of Finance Canada. 1986. “New Directions for the
Financial Sector.” Ottawa: Department of Finance.
De Ryck, K. 1997/1998. “Asset Allocation, Financial Market
Behavior, and Impact of EU Pension Funds on European
Capital Markets.”  In Hans Blommestein and Norbert
Funke, eds. Institutional Investors in the New Financial
Landscape. Paris: OECD.
Ford, Cristie. 2008. “New Governance, Compliance, and
Principles-Based Securities Regulation.” American Business
Law Journal 45(1). 
Galer, Russell. 2002. “”Prudent Person Rule” Standard for the
Investment of Pension Fund Assets.” Paris: OECD.
Available online at:
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/51/0/2763540.pdf.
Gray, Tara. 2005. “Dual Class Share Structures and Best
Practices in Corporate Governance.” paper PRB 05-26E.
Ottawa: Library of Parliament.
Mather, David. 2006. “The Inner Workings of Private Equity.”




OECD. 2007. “Survey of Investment Regulations of Pension
Funds.” Paris: OECD. Available online at:
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/7/38969997.pdf. 
Ontario Pension Board. 2007. Submission to The Expert
Commission on Pensions. Available online at:
http://www.opb.ca/CMS/Assets/Site+Documents/OPB+su
bmission.pdf .
Report of the Expert Commission on Pensions. 2008. “A Fine
Balance: Safe Pensions, Affordable Plans, Fair Rules.”
Ontario Expert Commission on Pensions.
Report of the Joint Expert Panel on Pensions Standards. 2008.
“Getting Our Acts Together: Pension Reform in Alberta
and British Columbia.” Alberta/British Columbia Pensions
Standards Review.
Puri, Poonam. 2007. “Pension Funds: Trends in Asset Allocation
and Role in Capital Markets, Corporate Governance and
Regulatory Policy.” Commissioned by the Ontario Expert
Commission on Pensions. 
Queisser, Monika. 1998. “Regulation and Supervision of
Pension Funds: Principles and Practices.” International
Social Security Review 51 (2). 
Shull, Bernard. 1999. “The Separation of Banking and
Commerce in the United States: An Examination of
Principle Issues.” The Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency, U.S. Department of the Treasury, Working Paper
99-1.
Sturm, Andreas, and Michael Badde. 2000. “Socially
Responsible Investment by Pension Funds: A State-of-the-
Knowledge Report.”  Basel: Ellipson AG. Aavailable at:
http://www.ellipson.com/files/studies/Socially%20Resonsib
le%20Investm.pdf .
Vittas, Dimitri. 1999. “Regulatory Controversies of Private
Pension Funds.” World Bank Policy Research Working
Paper No. 1893 (1999).     
Independent ￿ Reasoned ￿ Relevant C.D. Howe Institute 
References
C.D. Howe Institute Commentary© is a periodic analysis of, and commentary on, current public policy issues. James Fleming edited the manuscript;
Heather Vilistus prepared it for publication. As with all Institute publications, the views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily
reflect the opinions of the Institute’s members or Board of Directors. Quotation with appropriate credit is permissible.
To order this publication please contact: Renouf Publishing Company Limited, 5369 Canotek Road, Ottawa, Ontario K1J 9J3; or the 
C.D. Howe Institute, 67 Yonge St., Suite 300, Toronto, Ontario M5E 1J8. The full text of this publication is also available on the Institute’s website
at www.cdhowe.org.NOTES
| 14 Commentary 283Independent ￿ Reasoned ￿ Relevant C.D. Howe Institute 
Commentary 283 | 15
NOTESThe C.D. Howe Institute launched the Pension Papers in May 2007 to address key challenges facing
Canada’s system of retirement saving, assess current developments, identify regulatory strengths and
shortfalls, and make recommendations to ensure the integrity of pension earnings for the growing
number of Canadians approaching retirement. The Institute gratefully acknowledges the participation of
the advisory panel for the program: 
Advisory Panel: C.D. Howe Institute Pension Papers Program
Co-chairs:
Claude Lamoureux
Former President and CEO of the Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan
Nick Le Pan
Former Superintendent of Financial Institutions, Canada
Members:
Keith Ambachtsheer,
Rotman International Centre for Pension












Mercer Human Resource Consulting Limited;
Bryan Hocking/ Scott Perkin,
Association of Canadian Pension Management;
Steven James,
Canada Pension Plan Investment Board;
Michael Nobrega,











Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan;
Bank of Canada;
Terri Troy,
Pension Investment Association of Canada;
Fred Vettese,
Morneau Sobeco.
THE PENSION PAPERS PROGRAM
| 16 Commentary 283Commentary 283 | 17
RECENT C.D. HOWE INSTITUTE PUBLICATIONS
SUPPORTTHE INSTITUTE
For more information on supporting the C.D. Howe Institute’s vital policy work, through charitable giving or membership,
please go to www.cdhowe.org or call 416-865-1904. Learn more about the Institute’s activities and how to make a donation at
the same time. You will receive a tax receipt for your gift. 
A REPUTATION FOR INDEPENDENT, NONPARTISAN RESEARCH
The C.D. Howe Institute’s reputation for independent, reasoned and relevant public policy research of the highest quality is its
chief asset, and underpins the credibility and effectiveness of its work. Independence and nonpartisanship are core Institute
values that inform its approach to research, guide the actions of its professional staff and limit the types of financial
contributions that the Institute will accept.
For our full Independence and Nonpartisanship Policy go to www.cdhowe.org.
February 2009 Samson, Roger A., and Stephanie Bailey Stamler. Going Green for Less: Cost-Effective Alternative Energy Sources. 
C.D. Howe Institute Commentary 282.
February 2009 Renzetti, Steven. Wave of the Future: The Case for Smarter Water Policy. C.D. Howe Institute Commentary 281.
January 2009 Bataille, Chris, Benjamin Dachis, and Nic Rivers. Pricing Greenhouse Gas Emissions: The Impact on Canada’s
Competitiveness. C.D. Howe Institute Commentary 280.
January 2009 Laurin, Alexandre, Colin Busby, and Benjamin Dachis. “Out on a Limb: Assessing the Fiscal Sustainability and
Effectiveness of the 2009 Federal Budget.” C.D. Howe Institute e-brief.
January 2009 Parkin, Michael. What is the Ideal Monetary Policy Regime: Improving the Bank of Canada’s Inflation-Targeting
Program. C.D. Howe Institute Commentary 279.
January 2009 Robson, William B.P. “Boomer Bulge: Dealing with the Stress of Demographic Change on Government Budgets
in Canada.” C.D. Howe Institute e-brief.
January 2009 Robson, William B.P., Alexandre Laurin, and Finn Poschmann “Lasting Bang for the Stimulus Buck: Priorities
for the 2009 Federal Budget.” C.D. Howe Institute e-brief.
December 2008 Laidler, David, and Robin Banerjee. Unstable Foundations: Asset Markets, Inflation Targets, and Canada’s 2011
Policy Choices. C.D. Howe Institute Commentary 278.
December 2008 Dachis, Benjamin, Gilles Duranton, and Matthew A. Turner. Sand in the Gears: Evaluating the Effects of Toronto’s 
Land Transfer Tax. C.D. Howe Institute Commentary 277.
December 2008 Richards, John, Jennifer Hove, and Kemi Afolabi. Understanding the Aboriginal/Non-Aboriginal Gap in Student
Performance: Lessons From British Columbia. C.D. Howe Institute Commentary 276.
November 2008 Charlebois, Sylvain, and Richard Pedde. “A Bushel Half Full: Reforming the Canadian Wheat Board.”  
C.D. Howe Institute e-brief.
November 2008 Dodge, David A. “Central Banking at a Time of Crisis and Beyond: A Practitioner’s Perspective.”  
C.D. Howe Institute Benefactors Lecture.
November 2008 Laurin,  Alexandre, Finn Poschmann, and Robin Banerjee. “International Policy Responses to the Financial
Crisis: A Canadian Perspective.” C.D. Howe Institute e-brief.
November 2008 Pierlot, James. A Pension in Every Pot: Better Pensions for More Canadians. C.D. Howe Institute Commentary 275.
October 2008 Busby, Colin. “Fixing a Persistent Problem: Canada’s Regional Pockets of Unemployment.” 
C.D. Howe Institute e-brief.
October 2008 Richards, John. “Closing the Aboriginal/non-Aboriginal Education Gaps.” C.D. Howe Institute 
Backgrounder 116.
October 2008 Adler, Matthew. “Stumbling Forward on Trade: The Doha Round, Free Trade Agreements, and Canada.” 
C.D. Howe Institute e-brief.
October 2008 Card, David, Martin Dooley, and A. Abigail Payne. “School Choice and the Benefits of Competition: Evidence
from Ontario.” C.D. Howe Institute Backgrounder 115.C
C
.
.
D
D
.
.
 
 
H
H
o
o
w
w
e
e
 
 
I
I
n
n
s
s
t
t
i
i
t
t
u
u
t
t
e
e
6
7
 
Y
o
n
g
e
 
S
t
r
e
e
t
T
o
r
o
n
t
o
,
 
O
n
t
a
r
i
o
M
5
E
 
1
J
8
C
a
n
a
d
i
a
n
 
P
u
b
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
 
M
a
i
l
 
S
a
l
e
s
P
r
o
d
u
c
t
 
A
g
r
e
e
m
e
n
t
 
#
4
0
0
0
8
8
4
8